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We study a setting where imitative players are matched into pairs to play a Prisoners'
Dilemma game. A well know result in such setting is that under random matching
cooperation vanishes for any interior initial condition. The novelty of this paper is that
we add a certain correlation to the matching process: players that belong to a pair were
both parties cooperate repeat partner next period whilst all other players are randomly
matched into pairs. This intuitive correlation introduced in the matching process makes
cooperation the unique outcome in the long run under some conditions. Furthermore, we
show that no assortative equilibrium exits.
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11 Introduction
Individuals learn by imitation when their choices are based on the alternatives they observe
others choose. The inability of real life subjects to correctly understand and process all
the information they dispose of is a common justication for the use of imitation in some
economic models. For example, in a situation where many players interact with each other,
correctly anticipating other agents' actions can be a massive computational burden.
A well known property of imitation is that, under some conditions, it rules out dominated
actions1. Thus, if every period imitative players are randomly matched to play a Prisoner's
Dilemma game, cooperation vanishes. Given the importance of cooperation and its constant
presence in societies and the relevance of imitation for modeling bounded rational behavior
(see, for example, Axelrod (1984), Banerjee (1992), Eshel et al (1998) or Ellison and Fu-
denberg (1995)), the question we raise is: can cooperation survive when players learn by
imitation?
We answer this question by exploring the mechanism by which players are matched to
play a Prisoners' Dilemma game. The novelty of this paper is that a certain correlation is
introduced in the matching process: players who cooperated with each other last period meet
again in the next period whilst the rest of players are randomly matched into pairs. This
matching mechanism is inspired by a simple rule of thumb: no player should have incentives
to keep a non-cooperative partner. Examples of situations where this matching mechanisms
seems plausible range from dealing with business suppliers to academic co-authorship or
dating.
In the results of this paper, three main conclusions are achieved: First, under some
conditions and for any interior initial condition, the survival of cooperation is guaranteed.
That is, the situation where no player cooperates is not stable if some conditions on the
payo matrix and/or the specic imitative rule employed are satised. Second, no assortative
equilibrium exists. This means that, apart from the equilibria on the boundaries, a situation
where cooperative players do not face non-cooperative ones is not an equilibrium. Finally, we
nd that cooperation is more likely to prevail if imitation happens infrequently. In the limit
this means that for all payo matrices there exists a probability of imitating below which
some level of cooperation is always present in the long run.
The reason behind the survival of cooperation lies in the fact that the matching mechanism
considered in this paper adds a positive externality to playing cooperatively: in a situation
where two players cooperate, switching action has the disadvantage that next period a new
opponent, who might not be so keen on playing cooperatively, is faced. Thus, players that
1See, for instance, Schlag (1998) Remark 6.
2cooperate may enjoy more payo over time than these not cooperating. In this situation,
non-cooperative players imitate cooperative ones, making the survival of cooperation possible.
To our knowledge, only Levine and Pesendorfer (2007), Bergstrom (2003) and Bergstrom
and Stark (1993) study similar settings to the one considered in this paper. Levine and
Pesendorfer (2007) show that cooperation can survive within a population who learns by
imitation if each player holds some information about the strategy of the player with whom
she is matched. Bergstrom (2003) and Bergstrom and Stark (1993) proves conditions under
which cooperation survives in an evolutionary model where players are either cooperators or
defectors, and are more likely to face a player of their same type.
The dierence between this paper and Levine and Pesendorfer (2007) lies in that in our
model there is a set of matches that are anonymous whilst in Levine and Pesendorfer (2007)
all matches are non-anonymous to a certain degree. The present paper diers from Bergstrom
and Stark (1993) and Bergstrom (2003) in that players can change their actions from one
period to another. Thus, in our model, playing cooperatively in the present period is no
guarantee of exhibiting a cooperative behavior in the next period.
The issue of partner selection in cooperative games has recently attracted attention from
experimental economists. Duy and Ochs (2009) conduct an experiment where a Prisoners
Dilemma game with two treatments is considered. In the rst treatment, matching is com-
pletely random whereas in the second one each player always repeats partner. The authors
nd that cooperation does not emerge in the random matching setting while it does in the
xed pairs treatment. Yang et al (2007) present an experiment where a Prisoner Dilemma
game is played and individuals with similar histories are more likely to be matched together.
Their results show that cooperation has a higher chance of survival when a history-dependent
correlation is added to the matching process. Grimm and Mengel (2009) develop an exper-
iment where players choose between two Prisoner's Dilemma games that dier in the gains
from defection. Choosing the game with lower gains signals the player's willingness to coop-
erate. Grimm and Mengel nd that this self selection signicantly increases the amount of
cooperation.
In order to get a better understanding on cooperation a preferential partner selection,
we carry robustness checks and extensions to our main model. In particular, alternative
matching processes are considered as extensions to the main model; apart from the matching
mechanism whereby only cooperative pairs are maintained, we discuss the cases of complete
assortative matching (cooperators only meet cooperators, defectors only meet defectors), all
pairs are kept with some xed probability and, nally, a setting where correlation is not
perfect (only a fraction of cooperative pairs are maintained from one period to another). We
argue in which of these settings cooperation is more likely to be sustained in the long run
3and in which ones cooperation does not survive.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop the model. Section
3 presents the main analysis and the results. In Section 4, we present a further comparison
with the literature, a discussion on our assumptions, and some extensions. Finally, Section 5
concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a continuum of identical players uniformly distributed on the interval [0;1] with
the standard Borel-Lebesgue measure2. At the beginning of each period t = 0;1;2;:::, every
player is paired with another one and plays the following symmetric stage game against her
partner:




where C stands for cooperate and D stands for defect. The stage game above has the
standard Prisoners' Dilemma structure: T > R > P > S with T;R;P;S 2 R.
After the stage game is played, all pairs where at least one player chose D are broken
while the rest of pairs are maintained. After that, unpaired players are randomly matched
into pairs. The distribution of pairs at the beginning of period t = 0 is given.
Given the description above, at the beginning of each period t  1 the population is
divided into three sets: players who played C last period and faced an opponent who also
played C, CC, players who played C but faced an opponent who played D, CD, and the
rest, denoted by D. We use CC, CD and D to denote exchangeably both the sets and
their respective measure. Thus, for instance, CC is both the set of players who played C
and faced an opponent who also chose C, and the measure (fraction) of players who played
C and faced an opponent who also chose C.
Given the description above, we have that CC 2 [0;1], CD 2 [0;1) and D = 1  
CC   CD. Evidently, CD + CC  1 with equality only in the case when CC = 1 (if
CD + CC = 1 then all players chose C and, thus, all players faced another one playing C).
2All the results that follow are still valid if instead we consider a discreet but big population.
4Notice that the fraction of players who maintain partner equals CC. Furthermore, note that
all players in CD are matched with a player in D and, thus, CD  D.
Dene 
 as 
 = f(CC;CD) 2 R2
+ : CC +CD < 1 [ (CC;CD) = (1;0)g. Whenever
we refer to interior points we mean (CC;CD) 2 
 with CC +CD 2 (0;1) and CD  D.




Players follow very simple decision rules. In particular, they observe the action and payo
of a random individual3 and base their choice of action for the stage game on this information
plus the information from own action and payo. All players in the population are equally
likely to be observed.
Let A 2 fC;Dg be the action set and let P(fi;ai;igfj;aj;jg) 2 [0;1] be the probability
with which player i 2 [0;1] changes action if she, who played action ai 2 A and obtained
payo i 2 R, observes player j 2 [0;1], who chose action aj 2 A and achieved payo j 2 R.
Some assumptions on P are needed for the analysis:
Assumptions.
1. If ai = aj then P(fi;ai;igfj;aj;jg) = 0,
2. P(fi;ai;igfj;aj;jg) > 0 if and only if i < j and,
3. for all i;j 2 [0;1] and all ai;aj 2 A:
- if j > 0
j then P(fi;ai;igfj;aj;jg)  P(fi;ai;igfj;aj;0
jg),
- if i < 0
i then P(fi;ai;igfj;aj;jg)  P(fi;ai;0
igfj;aj;jg).
The rst two assumptions are standard in imitation models (see, for instance, Schlag
(1998)). Assumption 1 implies that players change their action only if the player they observe
played a dierent action than the one they chose. Assumption 2 means that there is a
positive probability of changing action if and only if observed action yielded more payo than
own action. The third assumption is a monotonicity condition that relates to reinforcement
learning models (see, for example, B orgers et al (2004) and Rustichini (1999)). It means
that the probability of changing action is weakly increasing in observed payo and weakly
decreasing in own payo.
We simplify notation when using the function P(fi;ai;igfj;aj;jg) as follows: Denote
by PCC : A2  R2 ! [0;1] the probability with which a player in CC changes to D. Let
PCD : A2  R2 ! [0;1] be the probability with which a player who belongs to CD changes
3Since we are dealing with a continuous population, results presented in this paper do not depend on how
many players are observed.
5to D. Finally, denote by PD : A2  R2 ! [0;1] the probability with which a player in D
changes to C.
Assumptions 1 3 impose some restrictions on the functional forms of PCC;PCD and PD.
The function PCC is only positive if the player in CC observes a player in D (assumption 1)
who faced a player in CD (assumption 2). In this case, the payo of observed player equals
T while own payo equals R. Thus, we can write PCC for CC < 1 as
PCC = CDf(T;R) (1)
for some function f : R2 ! [0;1]. The two arguments in f are observed payo and own payo
respectively. The function f is weakly increasing in its rst argument and weakly decreasing
in its second argument by assumption 3. Furthermore, by assumption 2, f(0;) = 0 for any
0 > .
The function PCD is only positive if the player in CD observes a player in D. In this
case, two dierent situations arise: If the player observed faced a player in CD, then observed
payo equals T and own payo equals S. On the other hand, if the observed player faced an
opponent in D, then observed payo equals P and own payo equals S. Therefore, we have
that
PCD = CDf(T;S) + (D   CD)f(P;S): (2)
Finally, PD is only positive if the player in D faced a player also in D and observed a
player that belongs to CC. In this case, observed payo equals R while own payo equals





if D > 0, PD = 0 otherwise.
Let t
CC and t
CD denote the values of CC and CD respectively at each point in time
t = 0;1;2;::: before the stage game is played with (0
CC;0
CD) 2 
 given. At t = 0 and
prior to the starting of the game, all players not in 0
CC are randomly and uniformly matched
into pairs. For notational convenience the argument t in the functions PCC;PCD and PD is
omitted.




CC (1   PCC) + t
CD (1   PCD) + t
DPD
 t























D > 0, t+1
CD = t+1
CC = 0 otherwise. Note that t
D > 0 implies t
CC < 1. Thus, t+1
CD and
t+1
CC are both well dened in all 
.
Equation (4) tells us the measure of players who played C in period t and faced a player
who chose D in t. The value of t+1
CD is computed as follows: The rst three terms represent
all players who played C in t (note that players in t
CC and t
CD played C in t   1 but may
have played D in t). The fourth term subtracts the pairs in t
CC where both players played
C again in t. Finally, the fth term subtracts the players not in t
CC who chose C in t and
faced a player one who also chose C in t.
Equation (5) is the measure of players who chose C in period t and faced an opponent
playing C in t. The value of t+1
CC is determined as follows: The rst term adds the pairs in
t
CC where both players played C in t as well. The second term adds the players not in t
CC
who chose C in t and faced a player who also chose C in t.
Next, we dene what an equilibrium of the model at hands is. Intuitively, an equilibrium
is a situation where the measure of players belonging to each of the sets CC, CD and D
does not change. Formally:
Denition 1. An equilibrium is a point (CC;CD) 2 






CC = CC and t
CD = CD.




Among all interior equilibria it is useful to single out the assortative equilibria. An
assortative equilibrium is an interior equilibrium where a fraction of the population play C
against themselves while all other players choose D. That is, in an assortative equilibrium
CD = 0 and the population is completely separated between cooperators and defectors.
Denition 3. An assortative equilibrium is an interior equilibrium where CD = 0.
In order to illustrate the behavior of the model we present two simulations, both gures
1 and 2 show the evolution of CC, CD, and D for certain parameter values where the
4Note that since we are dealing with a continuum population the system is deterministic.
7function f is given by what is known as the Proportional Imitation Rule (PIR henceforth)








As it can be observed in gure 1, during the rst periods the amount of cooperative
players matched with non-cooperative ones, CD, decreases. This is due to the fact that,
during these rst stages, most cooperative players enjoy less payo than cooperative ones.
However, as times evolves, more and more cooperative players meet each other. After this
grouping stage is over, the payo from cooperating is on average greater than that from
not cooperating. This happens because most cooperative players face players that are also
cooperative. The level of cooperation increases from there until all players have adapted the
cooperative action.
Figure 1: Simulation: PIR with T = 0:5, R = 0:4, P = 0, S =  0:1 and (0
CC;0
CD) = (0;0:5)
In gure 2, the payo players in a cooperative pairs get is lower than in the previous
simulation. This results in an environment where cooperation vanishes from the population.
In gure 2 one can se that the number of players in CC initially increases. This is simply
due to the fact that some of the players that belong CD are matched together and, if they do
5A deeper exposition of the relationship between this and other imitation rules and our model is presented
in sections 3.3.1, 3.3.2 and 3.3.3.
8not change their action immediately, they belong CC next period. However, the aggregate
level of cooperation decreases until cooperation eventually vanishes from the population.





In this subsection we consider the benchmark case of random matching. Under random
matching, all pairs are broken after the stage game is played. We show that, under random
matching, cooperation vanishes for any interior initial condition. The full analysis of the
random matching case is presented in the appendix; here we restrict our attention to the
main result from this analysis.











Proof. See Lemma 1 in the appendix.
As proposition 1 shows, under random matching cooperation does not survive in the
9population. This is the known result that under some monotonicity conditions (assumption
3) imitation rules out dominated actions.
With random matching, playing cooperatively is always dominated by the non-cooperative
behavior. This is partly because under random matching cooperating has no eect in any
period beyond the current one. As we shall see, once we add a certain correlation to the
matching process, playing cooperatively may no longer be a dominated action.
3.2 Correlated Matching
We now revert back to the case explained in section 2 where there is correlated matching, i.e.
pairs were both players cooperated are maintained in the next period. A rst result is that
there exist no assortative equilibrium.
Proposition 2. No assortative equilibrium exists.





CD and adding equation (4) to equation (5) we obtain
DPD   CCPCC   CDPCD = 0: (6)
The next step is to show that in an equilibrium with CD = 0 no pairs in CC are ever
broken. Assume the contrary, this means that some players from CC choose D. Hence,
if we are at time t then t+1
CC < t
CC unless a set of players in t
D switch to C. If this
happens, however, we have that some players will be matched against players who chose D
in t. Therefore, if a pair is broken, either t+1
CC < t
CC or t+1
CD > 0, a contradiction to the
denition of assortative equilibrium.
Given that in an assortative equilibrium no pairs are ever broken and that CC 2 (0;1),
it follows that all players always choose the same action in the stage game. This implies that
players in t
CC obtain a payo of R while players in t
D obtain a payo of P. Thus, from
assumption 2, it follows that PCC = 0 and PD > 0. However, when PCC = 0, equation (6)
implies that
DPD = 0: (7)
Since CC 2 (0;1), CD = 0 and PD > 0, we have that DPD > 0, a contradiction to
(7).
The intuition behind the result above is straightforward: In an assortative equilibrium,
cooperative players, CC, obtain a payo of R whilst all the other players, 1   CC, obtain
10a payo of P < R. Hence, non-cooperative players imitate cooperative ones but cooper-
ative players do not imitate non-cooperative ones. Therefore, the situation with complete
separation between cooperators and defectors is not an equilibrium.
3.3 No Interior Equilibria
We continue the analysis focusing on situations where the payo matrix and the function
f are such that no interior equilibria exists. Interior equilibria are considered later in the
paper. In the appendix we examine the conditions needed for the non-existence of interior
equilibria. These conditions are not presented here simply for the ease of the exposition6.
We are now ready to state one of the main results of this paper. Namely, if certain
conditions on the payo matrix and/or the specic imitative rule employed are satised,
then in the long run all players in the population cooperate.





















Proof. Given that no interior equilibrium exists and that the equations for the dynamics of
both CD and CC, equations (4) and (5), are continuous we have that no cycles can exist.
Once this fact has been established the result of the proposition follows from proposition 4
in the next subsection.
The idea behind the survival of cooperation is the following: Imagine a situation where
only a small fraction of players cooperate. Some of these players will be matched together,
thus, they repeat partner next period. This set of players playing cooperatively and that are
matched together obtain the second-highest payo, R. Since only very few players cooper-
ate, there is almost no player obtaining the maximum payo, T. Therefore, under certain
conditions, more non-cooperative players imitate cooperative ones than cooperative players
imitate non-cooperative ones.
6As one can see in the appendix, close form expressions of the conditions for the non-existence of interior
equilibria are straightforward to compute for numerical examples. However, this is not the case when a general
payo matrix and function f are considered.
11In what follows we seek a better understanding of the conditions in proposition 3 by
exploring how the population behaves when dierent imitative rules are assumed. We focus
our attention on three well known such rules: Proportional Imitation Rule, Imitate if Better
and Proportional Reviewing Rule.
3.3.1 Proportional Imitation Rule





where s 2 (0;1=(T   S)] is called the switching rate. The simulation in gures 1 and 2
assumed s = 1=(T  S). This value of the switching rate is known as the dominant switching
rate as it leads to the imitation rule that yields a weakly higher expected increase than any
other switching rate in the decision maker's payo in a multi-armed bandit decision problem
(Schlag (1998)).
From proposition 3, it is straightforward to show the following characterization for the
PIR with dominant switching rate
Corollary 1. Assume no interior equilibria exist. If the stage game is the one given in table






if (R   P)(T   S) > 2(T   R)(P   S), then limt!1 1
CC = 1.
Proof. When players employ the PIR with s = 1=(T   S) we can rewrite the condition for
all player to cooperate in proposition 3 as
(R   P)(T   S) > 2(T   R)(P   S):
The result follows.
To get a better understanding of the result above, we consider a particular case of the
payo matrix of the stage game.
Table 2: The Stage Game - Example
C D
C b   c;b   c  c;b
D b; c 0;0
12with 1 > b > c > 0. We can interpret b as the benet a player receives when her
partner cooperates and c as the cost of cooperating. In this case, we have the following
result.
Corollary 2. Assume no interior equilibria exist. If the stage game is the one given in table 2






if b > c
p
3, then limt!1 1
CC = 1.
Proof. Comparing the stage games in tables 1 and 2 we have that T = b, R = b c, P = 0
and S =  c. Using these values in corollary 1 gives the desired result.
Although s = 1=(T  S) is the dominant switching rate for multi-armed bandit problems,
it is the switching rate that is less likely to make cooperation possible in the long run. This
can be seen in the condition in proposition 3, the greater the value of f for any given payo
matrix, the less likely the condition for all players to cooperate holds. As a matter of fact,
for any payo matrix, if the switching rate is small enough then all players in the population
cooperate in the long run for any interior initial condition.
Corollary 3. Assume no interior equilibria exist. If the stage game is the one given in Table






, we have limt!1 1
CC = 1.
Proof. When player employ the PIR we can rewrite the condition for all player to cooperate
in proposition 3 as
s(R   P) > 2s2(T   R)(P   S):
Thus, for any T > R > P > S with T;R;P;S 2 R we can choose s small enough so that
the inequality above holds true.
A conclusion that can be drawn from corollary 3 is that when players are more cautious
in changing actions then cooperation is more likely to survive in the long run. As we shall
see in the next subsection, this fact also holds in the limit.
3.3.2 Imitate if Better
Imitate if Better (IB) consists of simply imitating with probability one whenever the action
observed yields more payo than own action. That is, f(0;) = 1 for all 0 > , f(0;) = 0
otherwise. We have the following result.






, we have limt!1 1
CC = 0.
Proof. When player employ IB we can rewrite the condition for all player to cooperate in
proposition 3 as 1 > 2, which is evidently empty.
As it was already hinted in the previous subsection when the PIR was considered, if
the likelihood of imitation is higher, the chances of cooperation to arise are lower. In the
limit, when the probability of imitating is one if observed payo is higher than own payo,
cooperation vanishes for any interior initial condition.
The intuition for the fact that more cautious imitation makes cooperation more likely is
that as the benets from cooperating appear after cooperators repeat partner, if players are
more likely to change their actions, then is much less likely that the benets from repeating
partner ever occur. Since these benets are what makes cooperation possible in our setting,
the fact that players change partner more often because of changing action more often makes
cooperation harder to sustain. We extend this nding to a situation where interior equilibria
are present and to any imitation rule in proposition 6 in the next subsection.
3.3.3 Proportional Reviewing Rule
The Proportional Reviewing Rule (PRR) is similar to the PIR except that own payo is
ignored. That is, the general form of the PRR is given by
f(0;) = s0
with s 2 (0;1=(T   S)]. Again, the parameter s is called the switching rate.
Corollary 5. Assume the stage game is the one given in table 1 and that players employ the





, if R(T   S) > 2TP, then
limt!1 1
CC = 1.
Proof. When player employ the PRR we can rewrite the condition for all players to cooperate
in proposition 4 as
R(T   S) > 2TP:
An immediate consequence from the corollary above is that if players employ the PRR
and that the stage game is the one in table 2, then in the long run all players cooperate for
14any interior initial condition. This is the case since in table 2, P = 0 and, thus, under the
PRR players that belong to CD only imitate those in D that were matched with a player in
CD. Therefore, since players in CD are less likely to change to the non cooperative action,
their share in the population increases and eventually they are matched together and, hence,
repeat partner next period, i.e. they belong CC. This process continues until all players
cooperate.
3.4 Interior Equilibria
We now consider situations where interior equilibria are present. The diculty of dealing
with these lie in the order of the system at hands. As the system in (4) and (5) is of order six,
checking for the existence and/or stability of interior equilibria for a general payo matrix
and an arbitrary function f becomes a highly complex computational task. Ultimately, this
means that we no longer present results about global converge. We proceed by restricting
our attention rst to local results and then we present a simulation where interior equilibria
exist.
We need to dene certain properties of the dierent equilibria when dealing with local
results. The denitions below are based on Khalil (1995).
Denition 4. Let Br(CC;CD) be the ball of radius r > 0 around the point (CC;CD) 2 
.
The equilibrium (CC;CD) 2 
 is







 \ B"(CC;CD) for all t  0,
 unstable if it is not stable,









CD)   (CC;CD)jj < ;
 a repeller if there exists a  > 0 such that if (0
CC;0
CD) 2 
 \ B"(CC;CD) for all
" 2 (0;) then (t
CC;t
CD) = 2 
 \ B(CC;CD) for some t  0,
Cooperation in the long run
Even if interior equilibria exist and independently on whether they are stable or not,
cooperation can survive in the population under the same conditions as those in proposition
3. Our second main result states this very fact. The reason for the survival of cooperation in
15the presence of interior equilibria is the same as the one behind the intuition of proposition
3.
Proposition 4. If f(R;P) > 2f(T;R)f(P;S), then the equilibrium (0;0) 2 
 is a repeller.
On the other hand, if f(R;P) < 2f(T;R)f(P;S), then the equilibrium (0;0) 2 
 is asymp-
totically stable.
Proof. See the appendix.
Note that most of the analysis carried out on the PIR, IB and PRR still applies in the
presence of interior equilibria. The only dierence is that if no interior equilibria are present
then cooperation being sustainable implies that all players cooperate in the long run.
All cooperate asymptotically stable
Even if the condition in proposition 4 is not satised, cooperation may still survive if the
initial amount of cooperators is high enough. This is proven in our next result.







< 1, then the equilibrium (1;0) 2 









the equilibrium (1;0) 2 
 is a repeller7.
Proof. See the appendix.
The relationship between the conditions in proposition 4 and proposition 5 are ambigu-
ous as parameter values and imitation functions can be found such that all four possible
combinations are possible.
To understand the result in proposition 5, imagine a situation where almost all play-
ers cooperate. In this case, if most defectors face other defectors, then cooperative players
achieve higher payo than non-cooperative ones. Thus, under certain conditions, the amount
of cooperators increases until all players cooperate. Assume, on the other hand, that most
defectors face cooperators. In this situation, defectors achieve higher payo than cooperators
and, thus, the total amount of cooperation decreases. However, the correlation in the match-
ing process favors matches between cooperators and tends to leave defectors matched with
other defectors. If the condition in proposition 5 is satised, the payo from cooperating
eventually surpasses that of non-cooperating and the amount of cooperation increases in the
population until all players cooperate.




D for all t.
16Cautious imitation
As already hinted when the dierent imitation rules where explored, we can deduce from
proposition 4 that more cautions imitation makes cooperation more likely. Hence, in a setting
where players are less likely to change actions cooperation is more likely to be present in the
long run. If we consider the limit where players change actions very infrequently we have the
following result:
Proposition 6. Assume the stage game is the one given in table 1. There exists a function








Proof. Take any function f that can be written as f(0;) = sg(0;) for some s > 0 and
some function g weakly increasing in its rst argument and weakly decreasing in its second
argument. Examples of such functions include the PIR, the PRR and f(0;) = s.
The condition in proposition 4 means that cooperation does not vanish from the popula-
tion if and only if f(R;P) > 2f(T;R)f(P;S). This condition can be rewritten as sg(R;P) >
2s2g(T;R)g(P;S). Thus, for any T > R > P > S and any g we can nd an s > 0 small
enough so that cooperation survives in the long run. This gives the desired result.
Note that proposition 6 above also means that if no interior equilibria are present then
for all payo matrixes we can nd a function  f such that for all f <  f the unique stable
equilibrium has all players cooperating.
Simulation
The behavior of the model when interior solutions are present is illustrated in gure 3.
In the simulation performed on the left hand size the initial level of cooperation in relatively
low, (CC;CD) = (0;0:1). On the contrary, in the simulation on the right hand side the
initial level of cooperation in relatively high, (CC;CD) = (0:8;0:1). The parameters of the
payo matrix are set to the same values as those in gures 1 and 2 except that the value of
R, the payo a cooperative couple obtain, lies in between the one used in gure 1 and the
one used gure 2. The imitation rule employed is again given by the PIR with dominant
switching rate. One can check that the parameter values and imitation function used are
such that both (CC;CD) = (0;0) and (CC;CD) = (1;0) are repellers.
As we can see on the left hand side of gure 3, the system converges to an interior
equilibrium where slightly over 18% of the population cooperates. On the right hand side of
gure 3, the initial level of cooperation is relatively high as 90% of the population initially
cooperates yet this results in the same level of cooperation in the long run as before.
17Figure 3: Simulation: PIR with T = 0:5, R = 0:26, P = 0, S =  0:1. Left hand side:
(0
CC;0
CD) = (0;0:1), right hand side: (0
CC;0
CD) = (0:8;0:1).
4 Literature, Discussion and Other Matching Protocols
4.1 Literature: Bergstrom and Stark (1993) and Bergstrom (2003)
Bergstrom and Stark (1993) consider an evolutionary model where every player's behavior
is hard wired to be either cooperate or defect. Each couples's ospring imitates either the
behavior of their parents or the behavior of a random individual from the population and
then plays a prisoner's dilemma game with each of her two siblings. The chances to survive to
reproductive age depend on the payo obtained and players that survive until reproductive
age are then matched and reproduce. In Bergstrom and Stark (1993) cooperation does not
survive if the ospring always imitate a random player from the population. This is the case
as in their model the prisoner's dilemma game is played with one's siblings, whose behavior
may not represent the average behavior in the population. That is, the prisoner's dilemma
game is played locally with one's siblings yet the imitation takes place at a population level.
In our model, imitation also takes place at a population level, all players in the population
are equally likely to be observed. However, players who are not in a cooperative couple are
randomly matched with another player from the entire population of non-cooperative couples.
That is, as opposite to our model, in Bergstrom and Stark (1993) matching is local.
Bergstrom (2003) presents an evolutionary model where, as in Bergstrom and Stark
(1993), players are hard wired to be either cooperators or defectors. In Bergstrom (2003)
the shares of each of the two types of players in the population change according to their
18expected payo. Thus, for instance, if cooperators get higher payo than defectors then their
share in the population increases whilst the share of defectors in the population decreases. In
Bergstrom (2003) matching is assortative as the probability of meeting a player of the same
type is dierent than the probability of meeting a player of a dierent type. The author shows
conditions in the probability that matchings are assortative under which cooperation prevails
in the long run. As we discuss below, if matching is completely assortative: cooperators only
meet cooperators and defectors only meet defectors, then cooperation is more likely to arise
than in the model presented in this paper, where assortative matching only occurs when the
two players in a pair cooperate.
4.2 Discussion
The long run behavior of the population can be determined to a certain extend by the initial
condition. For example, if no player cooperates initially, then no player ever cooperates. This
fact disappears if, for example, mutations or mistakes are introduced in the model. Given
that we are dealing with a continuum of population, introducing mistakes is straightforward.
Assume that at any given period with a small probability " > 0 each player makes a
mistake and chooses the action she intended not to. In this case and given that a continuum of
population exists, each period exactly a fraction " of players make mistakes. More specically,
a fraction "(CC + CD) of players that intended to choose C play D, and a fraction "D of
players that intended to choose D play C.
Results presented are still valid if, in the model with mistakes, an equilibrium is dened
as the situation where for any " the change in CC and CD is always smaller or equal than
"CC and "CD respectively. The convenience of adding mistakes is that unstable equilibria
are eliminated. That is, in the model with mistakes, if f(R;P) > 2f(T;R)f(P;S), then
cooperation emerges independently of the initial conditions.
In the model presented, when it comes to imitating another player all agents in the
population are equally likely to be observed. A sensible alternative is then to have correlation
in sampling. For instance, one can consider a situation where cooperators are more likely
to observe other cooperators and defectors are more likely to observe other non-cooperative
players. In this case, if cooperation can be present in the model considered in this paper then
cooperation is more likely in a setting where there is correlation in sampling. This is the case
as if players are more prone to observe those who choose their same action, then chances of
imitating are lower as a requirement for imitation is that a player choosing a dierent action
should be observed. However, as it can be inferred from proposition 6, if the probability of
imitating is lower, then cooperation is more likely to be present in the long run.
194.3 Other Matching Protocols
In this paper, we consider a matching mechanism whereby only the pairs where both play-
ers cooperate are maintained. This matching mechanism captures the simple idea that a
player should have no incentives to repeat partner unless the partner played cooperatively
last period. There are, however, other matching settings that could be considered. In this
subsection we explore dierent matching protocols as well as justify why players may have
incentives to keep cooperative partners only.
Assortative matching
An alternative matching protocol is such that matching is correlated for all the players
who choose the same strategy as their partners, i.e. not only the couples where both players
cooperate are maintained, pairs where both players do not cooperate are also maintained. In
this case cooperation is possible for a bigger set of parameter values than in our main model.
This is the case since the payo of non-cooperative players is lower than in our original model
as this players are less likely to be matched with a player being cooperative. In the model
presented, this is as if players in D who where matched with a player also in D repeat
partner and, thus, cannot be matched with a player in CD, which is the matching that gives
the highest payo to defectors.
All pairs are kept
Another sensible option is to assume that players always keep their partners. In this case,
cooperation is more likely to be present in the long run when compared to our main model as
defectors are less likely to nd a cooperator to take advantage of. That is, if all players repeat
partner, then assortative matching tends to occur faster. This is the case as the cooperative
players that are matched with a non-cooperative one are more likely to change to the non-
cooperative action as they repeat couple and their partner does not change action (as she gets
the highest possible payo). However, a population that is separated between cooperators
and defectors is not stable as the former always get more payo than the latter. Thus, the
share of cooperative pairs increases as gradually every two players in a non-cooperative pair
switch simultaneously to the cooperative action.
Pairs are kept with some xed probability
A further matching protocol is such that players keep their partner with some exogenous
probability. This setting is a mixture between the case where players never keep their partner
(random matching, section 3.1) and the case just described above. Therefore, one should
expect the chances that cooperation survives to depend on the exogenous probability by
which pairs are kept.
20Correlation is not perfect
A fourth alternative has cooperative pairs maintained with a probability that is less than
one. This imperfect correlation setting makes cooperation harder to be sustained as what
makes cooperation possible in the main model are the benets from repeating partner when
both parties cooperate.
Why keeping only cooperative partners?
We argued in the introduction that it seems a reasonable rule of thumb not to keep a
non-cooperative partner. A question is then to which extend this rule of thumb can appear
if players rationally decide whether to keep their partner or not. Given that players prefer
cooperative partners simply because facing a cooperative player strictly payo dominates
facing a non-cooperative one, a rational player chooses the option where the chances of
nding a cooperative partner are highest.
If players in CC keep their current couple then the chances of having a cooperative partner
are 1   PCC. If, however, they choose not to keep their couple, then they are matched with
another player at random from the population of CD and D. In this case the chances of
nding a cooperative partner are 1
1 CC (CD(1   PCD) + DPD). It is not hard to show that
1   PCC >
1
1   CC
(CD(1   PCD) + DPD)
and, thus, chances of having a cooperative couple are highest for players in CC if they keep
their current partner.
Clearly, players in CD want to change partner has their couple played D and obtained the
maximum possible payo and, furthermore, by changing partner there is some probability of
facing a player also in CD who cooperates with them. Finally, players in D have incentive to
change partners if their chances of meeting a cooperative player increase by facing a random
partner. If the player in D faced a player in CD then she looses her couple as the player
in CD wants top change partner. On the other hand, if the player in D faced a player
also in D then the chances that their current partner cooperates is given by CCf(R;P)
whilst the chances of having a cooperative partner if they change their couple are given by
1




(CD(1   PCD) + DPD)
and, thus, all players in D have the highest chances of meeting a cooperative player if they
change their partner. If f(R;P)  0:5 then under some circumstances players in D who
faced a player also in D prefer to keep their current partner. As already argued above when
assortative matching was considered, if this was allowed then cooperation would be possible
for a bigger set of parameter values than in our main model.
215 Conclusions
The present paper investigated cooperation in a setting where players who learn by imitation
are matched to play a Prisoner's Dilemma game. Our contribution to the literature lies in
the way matching takes place: players that belong to a pair were both parties cooperated
repeat partner while the rest of players are randomly matched into pairs.
In the benchmark case with random matching, we showed that cooperation vanishes for
any interior initial condition. When moving to the correlated matching setting, we proved
that if some conditions on the payo matrix and/or the specic way imitation takes place are
satised, then a positive amount of cooperation appears from any interior initial condition.
Furthermore, we found that no assortative equilibrium exists and that a situation where all
players cooperate can be stable in the long run. Finally, we showed that if players change
actions less frequently then cooperation has higher chances of surviving.
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With random matching, there is no need to distinguish between players who cooperated
and were paired with a player who also cooperated, CC, and players who cooperated and
faced a player who did not cooperate, CD. Thus, these two sets of players are grouped into
the same set C.
Let t+1
C the fraction of players who chose C at time t with 0
C 2 [0;1] given. Let 1   C
be the fraction of players who chose D at time t. Furthermore, let PRC : A2R2 ! [0;1] be
the probability with which a cooperative player switches to D and let PRD : A2R2 ! [0;1]
be the probability with which a player who chose D switches to C. Assume PRC and PRD
satisfy Assumptions 1   3. The evolution of C is then given by
t+1
C = t
C(1   PRC) + (1   C)PRD: (8)
Proceeding in a similar fashion as in equation (2), PRC is positive only if the player in
C observed a player in 1 C. Three dierent situations can occur now: First, if the player
23in C faced a player in C and observed a player who faced another one in C, then own
payo equals R while observed payo equals T. Second, if the player in C faced a player in
1   C and observed a player who faced another one in C, then own payo equals S while
observed payo equals T. Finally, if the player in C faced a player in 1   C and observed
a player who faced another one in 1   C, then own payo equals S while observed payo
equals P. Therefore, we have that
PRC = (1   C)

2
Cf(T;R) + (1   C)Cf(T;S) + (1   C)2f(P;S)

: (9)
On the other hand, we have that PD is positive only if the player in 1 C faced another
one who played D, and observes an individual choosing C that faced a player who also chose
C. In this case, observed payo equals R while own payo equals P. Hence, we can write
PRD as follows:
PRD = (1   C)2
Cf(R;P): (10)







Proof. We can see from equation (8) that both C = 1 and C = 0 are equilibria. The proof
is completed by showing that from any point C 2 (0;1) the system converges to C = 0.
If C 2 (0;1), using Assumptions 2 and 3 we obtain the following:
2
Cf(T;R) + (1   C)Cf(T;S) + (1   C)2f(P;S) > (1   C)Cf(T;S)
 (1   C)Cf(T;P)
 (1   C)Cf(R;P):




(1   C)Cf(T;S) + (1   C)2f(P;S):
Multiply both sides by C(1   C) and use equations (10) and (9) to obtain
PRD < C (PRC + PRD): (11)
From (8) we have that C = PRD   C(PRC + PRD). Hence, by equation (11), we
know that whenever C 2 (0;1), C < 0. Thus, no point C 2 (0;1) can be an equilibrium
and the system cannot converge to C = 1 from any initial condition C 2 (0;1).
24We still have to show that the system cannot converge to a point that is not an equilibrium.
This is straightforward since C is a polynomial in C and, hence, continuous for all C 2
[0;1].
On the Existence of Interior Equilibria
In order to characterize the existence of interior equilibria, we have to examine the equi-
libria of the system given in (4) and (5). As already stated in the main text, a necessary
condition for equilibrium is that equation (6) has to hold. If we substitute the values of
PCC;PCD and PD then equation (6) becomes
CCCD (f(T;R) + f(R;P)) + CDDf(P;S)
 CCDf(R;P) + 2
CD (f(T;S)   f(P;S)) = 0: (12)
Furthermore, if we impose the necessary equilibrium condition t+1
CC = t
CC and substitute
(12) in (5) we obtain












CD (1 + CCf(T;R)(2 + CC)) = 0: (13)
Equations (12) and (13) together with the fact that D = 1 CC  CD and CD  D
are necessary and sucient conditions for equilibrium. Thus, an interior equilibrium exists
if there is a (CC;CD) 2


 such that both (12) and (13) are satised.
Proof of proposition 3
Proof. Dene the set r = (CC;CD) 2


 \ Br(0;0). For suciently small " > 0 we can














The approximation above is correct up to a term of order "2. Thus, when the process is
arbitrarily close to (0;0), the change in CC with respect to the change in CD is negligible.
25The system above converges to CD = CC
f(R;P)
f(P;S)
8. Hence, if we start in " with " small,
the process converges to a situation where CD = CC
f(R;P)
f(P;S). The system may hit the path
CD = CC
f(R;P)
f(P;S) outside the set ". This poses no problem as the further away from (0;0)
the system can be in this case is within the set "
f(R;P)
f(P;S)
, which is also arbitrarily close to
(0;0) when " is small.
After starting in " and once the system reaches CD = CC
f(R;P)















The equation of the motion of CD is irrelevant because in the neighborhood of (0;0) the
system moves along the path CD = CC
f(R;P)
f(P;S) as we just proved. To be more precise, the
Center Manifold Theorem is being used here (see Sastry (1999) Section 7.8 or Khalil (1995)
Section 8.1).
By B ezout's Theorem, the system (4) and (5) has a nite number of solutions (see Kirwan
(1992)). Thus, we can x " > 0 such that no equilibrium points exists in " r (0;0).
For any  < ", if f(R;P) > 2f(T;R)f(P;S) then t+1
CC   t
CC > 0. Thus, since t+1
CC  
t
CC > 0 and CD = CC
f(R;P)
f(P;S), if the system starts in the boundary of , then it will leave
that set. Assume that the system, after leaving , does not hit the boundary of the other
bigger set ". Since for any point in " we have that t+1
CC   t
CC > 0, by continuity of (5)
and (4) if the process does not hit the boundary of " then we must have that there exists a
point (CC;CD) 2 " r (0;0) such that t+1
CC   t
CC = 0 and, thus, t+1
CD   t
CD = 0. That
is, there must exists at least one equilibrium point in " r (0;0), which is a contradiction.
Thus, if the process starts in , then it must hit the boundary of ". We know that for
any point in ", if f(R;P) > 2f(T;R)f(P;S) then t+1
CC   t
CC > 0 and CD = CC
f(R;P)
f(P;S).
Thus, starting in boundary of  the process leaves ", which is the condition for the point
(0;0) 2 
 to be a repeller.
Assume now that f(R;P) < 2f(T;R)f(P;S). By continuity, t+1
CC   t
CC < 0, CD =
CC
f(R;P)
f(P;S) and the fact that no equilibrium point exists in " r (0;0), if the system starts
in " r  then it eventually enters the set  for any  < ". This is the condition for
asymptotic stability.
8If f(P;S) = 0 then the result in the lemma follows.
26Proof of proposition 5
Proof. Proceeding in a similar fashion as above, dene the set 0




For suciently small " > 0, we can disregard terms of order o("2) and write t+1
D using the





CD (f(R;P) + f(T;R))   t
Df(R;P):
Assume " is such that no equilibrium points exists in 0
" r (1;0). Then the system
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For any  < ", if A < 0 then t+1
CC   t
CC < 0. Thus, since t+1
CC   t







, if the system starts in the boundary of 0
, then it will leave that
set. Assume that the system, after leaving 0
, does not hit the boundary of the other bigger
set 0
". Since for any point in 0
" we have that t+1
CC   t
CC < 0, by continuity of (5) and (4)
if the process does not hit the boundary of 0
" then we must have that there exists a point
(CC;CD) 2 " r(1;0) such that t+1
CC  t
CC = 0 and, thus, t+1
CD  t
CD = 0. That is, there
must exists at least one equilibrium point in " r (1;0), a contradiction.
Thus, if the process starts in 0
, then it must hit the boundary of 0
". We know that for
any point in 0
", if A < 0 then t+1
CC   t







in boundary of 0
 the process leaves 0
", which is the condition for the point (1;0) 2 
 to be
a repeller.
Assume now that A > 0. By continuity, t+1
CC  t







fact that no equilibrium point exists in " r (1;0)0, if the system starts in 0
" r 0
 then it
eventually enters the set 0
 for any  < ". This is the condition for asymptotic stability.




D for all t. Furthermore, convergence is guaranteed as no equilibrium point
exists in 
0
" r (1;0) and, thus, 
0
" r (1;0) cannot contain any cycle.
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